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Affirming the Individual: 
An Assessment of Preferential Treatment 
by Clayton]. Stallbaumer 
Programs of affirmative action, having been brought to the forefront of the 
nation's collective consciousness in recent times, represent one of the most fun-
damental conflicts at issue in our concept of a legal system: the confrontation 
between individual rights and social policies. In assessing the responsibilities, 
validity, and motivations of these programs, consideration must be given to the 
balancing of competing rights to equality and that tempering act's placement 
within or opposed to the relevant larger social interests. Such analysis is often 
confused by disagreement over the substantive and causal nature of social real-
ity as well as the ideals of equality to which affirmative action policies aspire. 
The idea of equality itself proposes a unique problem, for any attempted defini-
tion or abstraction of the concept is necessarily subjective, having emerged out 
of a social context fraught with both innate and overt prejudices and institutions 
that impart a certain degree of influence to such interpretation. Comprehensive 
descriptions are also understandably discouraged by the ethereal and extensive 
nature of equality, suggesting that any effort at explication is necessarily exclu-
sive or shortsighted. 
Arriving at a definition of equality will not be the emphasis of this essay, 
though such a critical concern cannot be wholly ignored. Rather, it will be the 
goal of this study to examine situations of inequality-the underlying discrep-
ancies of social reality-as the aggregate object of various proposed and imple-
mented correctives, including those offered by affirmative action plans. To sim-
plify this argument, analysis will be restricted to the appropriateness and influ-
ence of preferential treatment in hiring and college admission practices. In ad-
dition, consideration will be given to the rationales behind such willful supposi-
tions, revealing an inherent contrariness both between and within the various 
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schools of thought surrounding the issue. By way of conclusion, this report will 
advocate an individuated policy of arbitration and decision that considers both 
the rights of the individual as well as the relevant social interests at work. 
While combatants on the issue of affirmative action differ drastically in their 
opinions of that policy's credibility and effects, there is a general consensus on 
the distinct social inequalities perpetrated by past discrimination that persist 
into the present as part of a tainted social reality. Richard Wasserstrom clarifies 
the notion of "social reality" when he asserts that such a concept "is concerned 
with rendering a correct description of the existing social arrangements, includ-
ing the existing institutional structures, practices, attitudes and ideology."1 As a 
true-to-life contemplation of surrounding circumstances, social reality offers 
insight into patterns of behavior that dictate these conditions. Existing instances 
of discrimination appear in a multitude of forms, most often identifiable by the 
suffix -ism, as in racism and sexism. This discrimination is based on perceived 
differences, though, as Martha Minow suggests, such distinctions are invariably 
relative: "To be different is to be different in relationship to someone or some-
thing else - and this point of comparison must be so taken for granted, so much 
the 'norm,' that it need not even be stated."2 It becomes essential, then, to iden-
tify and establish the perspective and prerogative from which discrimination 
evolves and in which it operates; Minow calls this "making explicit the unstated 
points of reference."3 By doing this, one realizes that discrimination is an act of 
both volition and cognition that emerges from and exercises its influence within 
prescribed spheres of interest. Indeed, as Wasserstrom purports, "Racism and 
sexism consist in taking race and sex into account in a certain way, in the context 
of a specific set of institutional arrangements and a specific ideology which to-
gether create and maintain a specific system of institutions, role assignments, 
beliefs and attitudes."4 Discrimination can be seen, therefore, as a cooperative 
and reflexive agent of the society that fosters it, perpetuating and exacerbating 
the circumstances of inequality that it exhibits and by which it is exhibited. 
A major difficulty embodied by discrimination is rooted in a basic miscon-
ception of that society in which it operates. Minow proposes that this miscon-
ception can be explained in terms of five unstated assumptions. The first has 
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already been addressed, that of differences being relative in reality rather than 
innate, as is the common faulty premise. The second tacit tenet, that of "an 
unstated point of reference [adopted] when assessing others,"5 was similarly 
addressed in the repudiation of the first assumption. It should be realized that 
such a perspective (or any perspective, for that matter) is necessarily subjective 
and specific to the circumstances surrounding it. To accept this prerogative as 
implicit is to disregard its comparative nature. The third assumption Minow 
contemplates is an "aspiration to impartiality" on the part of the observer, the 
idea that one can make judgments without incorporating or imposing one's own 
beliefs. This goal of objectivity is an admirable one but also one that cannot be 
realized, for inevitably the observer succumbs to preconceptions and affected 
perceptions. 6 The fourth unstated premise Minow attacks is the supercilious 
disregard for other perspectives assumed by the dominant viewpoint, by either 
deeming them irrelevant or believing them to have been already assimilated.7 
The final fallacious supposition is perhaps the weightiest, for its overarching 
scope takes the other assumptions into account. The dilemma posed by differ-
ence "appears only when the background assumption is that the status quo is 
neutral and natural rather than part of the discriminating framework that must 
itself be changed. "8 Such a notion suggests, somewhat paradoxically, that dis-
crimination and inequality are at once symptoms and causes of an unjust soci-
ety. If this is the case, however, what corrective measures, if any, can be taken? 
What degree of success can they be expected to achieve? And finally, what should 
be the emphasis of such policies? Answers to these questions can be found in an 
assessment of past and current plans of affirmative action and their respective 
motiva.tions, as well as commentary and criticism on such practices. 
Policies of affirmative action have existed and continue to exist according to 
varying degrees of preferential treatment and social aims. In its strongest sense, 
affirmative action proposes to correct or compensate for past discrimination 
and its present consequences and effects by giving strong preference to disad-
vantaged groups, by stressing difference in order to achieve some concept of 
equality whose definition, it has been shown, is problematic. The significance 
given to the end goal-"the reduction of a great social injustice"9-reveals such 
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policies to be arguably product-oriented. Moderate to weak approaches, on the 
other hand, emphasize difference less than equality in the sense that any preference 
shown is of medium to minimal import and at least ostensibly non-compensatory. 
As such, these policies can be seen as more process-oriented. Despite the intrinsic 
differences of these programs, however, there emerge common concerns and issues 
about their necessity, applicability, validity, and social responsibility. These issues 
are prompted by and addressed in numerous works of legal scholarship that incor-
porate a number of different perspectives both advocating and condemning prac-
tices of preferential treatment. Much of this discourse stems from the controversial 
1978 Supreme Court case Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, in which a 
college admission policy of racial quotas was repudiated on the grounds that it vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment. A more in-depth examination of the Court's 
decision will be entertained later. 
A fundamental issue that arises in the debate over affirmative action is the 
balance to be struck between the rights of the individual and the pursuit of a 
specified social goal. Deciding which contending entity bears greater weight 
has been a prominent sticking point in this discourse and is often reduced to 
temporal terms, i.e., to considerations of long-term versus short-term effects 
and intentions. While all sides are in agreement that there are social ills to be 
remedied, argument also ensues over the appropriateness of preferential treat-
ment in hiring and college admissions, with contention expressed as to whether 
those venues are where corrective social initiatives with such obvious prefer-
ence should be most explicitly implemented. 
Ronald Dworkin, an astute legal scholar, considers that such measures are 
indeed befitting given the pattern of shortcomings demonstrated by past at-
tempts at social remedy, especially those addressing race discrimination. In his 
consideration of the Bakke case, Dworkin concludes that the preference associ-
ated with affirmative action policies, particularly strong ones, is necessary, for 
"we have not succeeded in reforming the racial consciousness of our society by 
racially neutral means," and that such racially conscious programs are justified 
in using "strong measures because weaker ones will fail." 10 This heightened 
deference to seemingly divisive measures poses substantial difficulties, however. 
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First, such an outlook has the arguable potential to exacerbate existing racial 
discord through its racially conscious emphasis. Second, it remains to be seen if 
such a rift can be justified or ameliorated by the policies' good intentions. 
Dworkin addresses both these concerns by separating the issue into short-
term and long-term considerations. The programs' conceded short-term fric-
tion, he confutes, would be eclipsed by its beneficent long-term goal "to lessen 
not to increase the importance of race in American social and professional life. "11 
Taking an extended view, the subsequent standardization and recalibration of 
hiring and college admission policies to take account of past and present dis-
crimination-the proverbial leveling of the playing field-would, by Dworkin's 
reasoning, render dilatory the compensatory preference currently brought to 
bear on race and other equally disadvantaged (and uncontrollable) attributes. 
This utilitarian benefit of a strong affirmative action policy, because "it makes 
the community as a whole better off," thus outweighs the interim disadvantage 
accorded to some individuals. 12 
Much issue has been taken with this inclination to value social goals over 
individual rights. Alan Goldman, presenting the Libertarian stance on affirma-
tive action, is the foil to Dworkin's argument. Goldman's main contention in 
this presentation is the assertion of the supremacy of individual rights that do 
not infringe upon the rights of others. In stating this belief, Goldman stresses 
that the "principal purpose of recognizing individual rights within a system of 
social justice is to protect individuals from losses whenever utilitarian calcula-
tions run against them in particular cases." Goldman goes on to claim that the 
determination of a social interest does not necessarily justify a society's pursuit 
or furthering of that interest, particularly not at the expense of individual rights. 13 
Indeed, Dworkin concedes that the only "genuine principle" at work is "the 
principle that no OIJ-e should suffer from the prejudice or contempt of others."14 
The question persists, however, as to the impetus behind such a decision to 
promote individual rights and how such a decision can take account of and ad-
dress existing social discrepancies. 
In a contest of competing interests, Goldman recognizes the importance of 
striving toward some sense of equality and, in so doing, makes a key distinction 
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within that abstract concept that is echoed in other works. The idea that "rules 
must not only apply to all, but as far as possible operate to the good of all ... [to] 
result not in equality of goods, but in something approaching an equ·al chance 
to acquire goods through effort"15 suggests that there exists a recognizable dif-
ference between equal treatment and treatment as an equal. This dualistic con-
cept is developed more fully by Dworkin, who contends that the former in-
volves equal distribution of benefits or burdens while the latter indicates equal 
consideration, though not equal outcome, for those distributions. 16 In general, 
it can be said that the strength of preference advocated by a program of affirma-
tive action corresponds to the relative degree to which that program seeks the 
right to equal treatment. By corollary, the weaker the preference shown by such 
a program, the greater its aspiration is to guarantee the right to treatment as an 
equal, though any delimited preference cannot fully achieve this more funda-
mental right because such preference, no matter how slight, values not the rights 
of individuals but the assumed or conferred rights of one group over another. 
Shelby Steele makes a provocative case against strong-sense affirmative ac-
tion in the vein of conferred group rights by asserting that such preference on 
the basis of race has a substantially deleterious effect on its recipients. The only 
affirmation Steele identifies in programs of compensatory preferential treat-
ment is the reaffirming of black inferiority through messages emphasizing vic-
timization and deterred responsibility. The former, Steele asserts, "is what jus-
tifies preference, so that to receive the benefits of preferential treatment one 
must, to some extent, become invested with the view of one's self as victim."17 
Such a self-concept encourages the exploitation of past victimization as a source 
of privilege and power. This emphasis runs counter to the promotion of re-
sponsibility and self-determination by sending the message to blacks that "there 
is more power in [their] past suffering than [their] present achievement-none 
of which could bring [them] a preference over others."18 The crux of this account 
is that compensatory preferential treatment encourages its recipients to rely on 
others rather than themselves for a reprieve from disadvantage. As such, pro-
grams of strong affirmative action do little to address underlying social discrep-
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ancies in Steele's estimation. Instead, the results of these policies are hollow, 
token displays that attempt to remedy the symptoms of disadvantage rather than 
the cause. Steele condemns affirmative action for "leap[ing] over the hard busi-
ness of developing a formerly oppressed people to the point where they can 
achieve proportional representation on their own."19 Rather than leveling the 
playing field, affirmative action by this argument instead changes the rules of 
the game at the expense of both the individual and fairness in the sense of treat-
ment as equals. 
The inherent arbitrariness and unavoidable subjectivity of group identifica-
tion and redressing group disadvantage provide another point of contention in 
the debate over affirmative action. The problem of indeterminacy is most ap-
parent in the decision of the Bakke case. For the majority opinion, Justice Powell 
became the prominent voice against the particularly strong-sense affirmative 
· action inherent in UC-Davis' medical school admission policy's quota system. 
Claiming that "no formal definition of 'disadvantaged' was ever produced," 
Powell makes clear the Court's historical forbearance in determining· legitimate 
exercises of preference: "We have never approved preferential classifications in 
the absence of proved constitutional or statutory violations."2° Furthermore, 
Powell asserts that "there is no principled basis for deciding which groups would 
merit 'heightened judicial solitude' and which would not."21 The Court's resis-
tance to defining appropriate instances of preference is also a testament to the 
inherent difficulties of determining when those measures would be deemed to 
have sufficiently completed their assigned and assumed purpose. As George 
Sher suggests, "there would be no way for us to decide how much preferential 
treatment is just enough to make up for the efforts that a particular disadvan-
taged individual would have made under happier circumstances."22 Determin-
ing those groups which are disadvantaged-how much preference they are to 
be granted and even if that preference is justified-becomes and remains of 
central concern in the consideration of policies of affirmative action. 
The issue of indeterminacy is echoed in the work of Lon Fuller, another 
prominent legal scholar. In The Morality of Law, Fuller declares that the gener-
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ality of proposing to remedy discriminatory social ills is an end too broad to be 
defined or justified. "If a legislator is attempting to remove some evil," Fuller 
contends, "and cannot plainly identify the target at which his statute is directed, 
it is obvious he will have difficulty in making his laws clear."23 The implicit 
failure of making laws to fulfill a general and indefinable goal lies in the lack of 
clarity that such laws would possess, a shortcoming detrimental to the legality 
of a system of legal justice. Fuller also affirms the existence of a commonness to 
our humanity that prevents any preferential distinctions from being made. As-
serting that what he calls the morality of aspiration-the intrinsic human effort 
at self-betterment-is "after all a morality of human aspiration," Fuller pro-
poses that such a fundamental and innate ambition "cannot refuse the human 
quality to human beings without repudiating itself."24 Fuller advances his argu-
ment by professing that policies of preferential treatment represent an effort to 
"qualify our answer by adding some biological tagline to our own title," and 
that such an endeavor necessarily denies "the human quality to ourselves in an 
effort to justify denying it to others."25 In the course of his refutation of affirma-
tive action programs, Fuller depicts the efforts of these practices and the un-
clear rationale behind them as divisive and, in a sense, ultimately dehumanizing. 
Given the glut of substantive criticisms against policies of affirmative action, 
it is worthwhile to consider alternative hiring and college admission methods 
that focus on other evaluative criteria, the most common of which being the 
loosely defined idea of performance qualifications or, even more abstract, merit. 
It will be revealed, however, that policies emphasizing merit and subsequently 
disregarding race as a relevant factor in decision making are as unjust as their 
counterparts that embrace compensatory preferential treatment based on per-
ceived disadvantage. This failing is due in large part to the faulty assumption 
that merit-based policies operate in an ideal world where social discrepancies, if 
they exist, are irrelevant to evaluative consideration. Such a presumption is fatal 
and condemns those programs of consideration as stridently as the five unstated 
assumptions of affirmative action condemn those policies of preference. 
Not recognizing disadvantage unwittingly perpetuates it; such is the pri-
mary deficiency captured in hiring and college admission policies that focus 
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solely on performance qualifications and merit. Again, though, the distinction 
must be made between equal treatment and treatment as equals. Merit-based 
programs ostensibly act in advocacy of the latter, though this facade collapses 
when one considers that prevailing social discrimination and discrepancies, which 
such programs fail to acknowledge, act against equal consideration. Initial dis-
advantage, the argument insists, prevents the attainment by the disadvantaged 
of equal success as measured by and reflected in performance qualifications such 
as educational background and test scores. Indeed, as Goldman suggests, "what 
is most unjust about the present practice of hiring by competence ... is the fact 
that some have initial headstarts toward [social] benefits which are insurmount-
able."26 Ignorance or neglect of existing social discrepancies is an equal if not 
greater misdeed for society and disadvantaged groups than compensating for 
them at the expense of individual rights. 
Such a realization prompts one to consider, somewhat paradoxically, as Minow 
does, that "the problems of inequality can be exacerbated both by treating the 
members of minority groups the same as members of the majority and by treat-
ing the two groups differently. "27 The question then becomes whether different 
treatment, not necessarily but quite often preferential, hinders social develop-
ment more or less so than treatment that is insensitive to perceived differences. 
Misguided corrective policies that erroneously address this inquiry often fur-
ther worsen the existing situation. The resulting discrepancies in competence 
"constitute reasonable barometers of prior efforts to acquire competence only 
where the educational system has attempted to correct for initial inequalities."28 
In light of this consideration, it becomes a point of contention as to whether 
corrective policies can exist apart from or be implemented without embodying 
the immanent discrimination of the disadvantage-conscious society that advo-
cates them. 
A less grounded but no less relevant condemnation of merit-based programs 
exists as an argument similar to the problem of indeterminacy demonstrated in 
the consideration of affirmative action programs. The twin concepts of perfor-
mance qualifications and merit are no less arbitrary or subjective than the loosely 
contrived definitions of disadvantage. Indeed, as Dworkin suggests, "there is no 
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combination of abilities and skills and traits that constitutes 'merit' in the ab-
stract. " 29 Standardized test scores, despite their claims to the contrary, are the 
measure of one's aptitude at taking that particular test only, not a generalized 
indication of competency and ability, abstractions for which there exist no satis-
fying and definite conceptions. Patricia Williams takes this argument further by 
suggesting that standards are "concrete monuments to socially accepted subjec-
tive preference" and "nothing more than structured preference."30 Revealing 
the inequality evident in society as inherent to an evaluative process and its 
criteria casts doubt on that program's credibility. 
With what are we left, then, as a paradigm for evaluative consideration in 
hiring and college admission policies? Programs of affirmative action have been 
demonstrated as both socially ineffectual and injurious to individual rights. Such 
policies' major failing can be found in their preferential consideration of groups 
rather than individuals. Nagel recognizes this treatment as "a departure from 
the ideal ... that people should be judged on the basis of individual characteris-
tics rather than involuntary group membership."31 Minow echoes this senti-
ment, stating that "specifically articulating permissible and impermissible uses 
of difference may enshrine categorical analysis," a departure from the ideal of 
individual consideration similar to that offered by Nagel. 32 Conversely, prac-
tices emphasizing merit qualifications have been shown to be ill-defined and 
ignorant or neglecting of existing social discrepancies and discrimination. Both 
types of policies perpetuate and even exacerbate the disadvantage that engen-
ders them, though in sublimely different ways. The prevailing choice among 
these policies is a decision rooted in determining the lesser of the social evils 
offered by each. The policies' respective detriments can be traced to their short-
sightedness, a downcast tribute to their respective preferential and singularly 
arbitrary focuses. 
A plausible policy that defies the demonstrated limitations of preferential 
treatment based on disadvantage or merit accomplishment involves a broad-
based consideration of the applicant as a whole and as an individual. Such a 
program would have as its driving ideology the pursuit of John Stuart Mill's 
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marketplace of ideas, the development of an open society in which the opinions 
and thoughts of all could be voiced and heard. This emphasis does not dictate a 
condition or practice of equal treatment, however, for some will inevitably be 
less qualified than others for such a society. Instead, through open and equal 
consideration, it is the process by which those qualifications would be deter-
mined and assessed that would set such a policy apart from others. An open 
assessment of the applicant as a whole would involve consideration of the en-
tirety of contributions that the individual could bring to the community con-
comitant with a goal of diversity set forth by the institution's mission statement. 
Diversity in this sense is not limited to race or economic disadvantage, but in-
cludes a multitude of various attributes deemed beneficial to the institution that 
do not infringe upon an individual's right to treatment as an equal. In some 
instances, such a policy might mistakenly be construed as promoting affirma-
tive action in the weak sense, but it should be noted that any preference shown 
is non-compensatory and so minimal as to be regarded as marginal. A full con-
sideration of the particular attributes an applicant could contribute to the open 
community and an assessment made on that basis is an affirmation of the indi-
vidual and a worthy goal for which society should strive. 
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